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Abstract
This paper examines trade and welfare eﬀects of biotechnology. While biotechnology lowers pro-
duction costs, it also lowers perceived quality of products. Without labelling, consumers cannot
distinguish between biotechnology and conventional products. In a simple general equilibrium model
of two-country trade, it is shown that when a biotechnology product is invented in one country, the
importing country may lose from trade under free trade without labelling. The importing country can
be better oﬀ by requiring labelling for the biotechnology product. If labelling cost is high, however,
the importing country may prefer to ban the import of the biotechnology product.
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11 Introduction
International trade disputes on trade in agricultural and food products have increasingly
been caused by advances in biotechnology. The dispute on genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMOs) is such an example.1 The dispute on hormone-treated beef between the European
Union (EU) and the United States (US) is another example.2 Import ban and mandatory
labelling are typical trade measures for dealing with these biotechnology products.
The diﬀerences among countries in technology level in biotechnology and in consumers’
attitudes toward biotechnology products seem to be part of the main causes of trade dis-
putes. The US is the current world leader in biotechnology. European countries and
Japan are still far behind the US despite their eﬀorts.3 On the other hand, consumer sur-
veys show that North American consumers tend to be more tolerant toward biotechnology
products, while European consumers tend to be more concerned about these products.4
Biotechnology products have some speciﬁc features. First, many of the currently avail-
able biotechnology products are aimed at reducing production costs. Second, some con-
sumers perceive these products as being of lower quality because of their potential negative
impacts on human health and on the environment.5 Third, these products are credence
goods in the terminology of Darby and Karni (1973). That is, consumers cannot know
whether a product is biotechnologically modiﬁed or not even after consuming it.6
Given these features of biotechnology products, one may wonder how countries are
aﬀected by an innovation in biotechnology in one country through international trade. In
order to examine this issue, I construct a general equilibrium model in which the economy
1Exporting countries of GMOs, such as the United States, argue against mandatory labelling imposed by importing
countries, such as the European Union and Japan.
2The EU banned the import of US beef supplemented with growth promoting hormones. The US appealed to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO ruled against the EU in 1997, because the import ban was not based on scientiﬁc
grounds. See Bureau et al. (1998) and Vogel (1995, Chapter 5) for details.
3In recent years the US has ﬁled 53.7 per cent of patents for biotechnology, while the EU shares 32.6 per cent and Japan
shares only 7.7 per cent (Paillotin, 1998).
4For example, Hoban (1997) reports that surveys show diﬀerences among countries in consumers’ willingness to buy
biotechnology products. While about three-quarters of the US and Canadian respondents are willing to buy biotechnology
products (US: 73%; Canada: 74%), only 22% of Austrian and 30% of German respondents are willing to buy these products.
In many European countries, about 50 to 60% of respondents answered they are willing to buy these products.
5For example, Kerr (1999) provides detailed discussion on features of genetic modiﬁcation. Chataway and Assouline
(1998) discuss in detail potential environmental risks of GMOs.
6In this sense, credence goods are distinguished from experience goods whose quality consumers can know only after they
consume these goods (Nelson, 1970).
2consists of two sectors: food and manufacturing. The manufacturing sector is taken as
the numeraire. In the food sector, there are a large number of competitive ﬁrms that
engage in production of ﬁnal good and a large number of competitive ﬁrms that provide
an intermediate good to the ﬁnal good ﬁrms. There is also one ﬁrm that engages in
research and development to supply a biotechnology-derived intermediate good. There
are two types of consumers: concerned and unconcerned. Concerned consumers perceive
biotechnology food as a lower quality product. Unconcerned consumers do not perceive
any quality diﬀerence between biotechnology and conventional food. The government
decides whether to regulate the marketing of the biotechnology food either by requiring
mandatory labelling or by banning it. There are two countries: home and foreign. I
consider the case where a biotechnology product is invented in the foreign country.
The main results are as follows: Since the model is Ricardian, the pattern of trade
is rather straightforward. That is, at least one country specializes and which country
specializes depends on the relative demand. When trade takes place without labelling,
neither country produces conventional food. By imposing mandatory labelling of biotech-
nology food, the home country domestically produces and consumes conventional food.
With regard to welfare eﬀects of trade, the foreign country gains from trade, regardless
of trade with or without labelling. By contrast, the home country may lose from trade if
trade takes place without labelling. The home country is more likely to lose from trade if
the home consumers are more concerned about negative eﬀects of biotechnology food. The
home country can be better oﬀ by imposing mandatory labelling if the home consumers
are highly concerned about biotechnology food and labelling cost is not so high. This
mandatory labelling lowers foreign welfare. If the home consumers are highly concerned
about biotechnology food but labelling cost is very expensive, then the home country
prefers a ban on the import of biotechnology food rather than labelling. The import ban
hurts the foreign country more severely than labelling does.
In the trade policy literature, while several papers have examined trade policies for
products with unknown quality,7 labelling has been rather ignored. Moreover, most of the
existing papers examine trade policies for experience goods (Nelson, 1970) and few papers
have examined those for credence goods. An exception is Bond (1984), who examines trade
7See, for example, Donnenfeld et al. (1985), Grossman and Horn (1988), and Bagwell and Staiger (1989).
3and welfare eﬀects of labelling as well as tariﬀs for products with unobservable qualities.
This paper is diﬀerent from his in some respects. First, since he assumes ﬁxed supply of
goods, a high quality good is supplied even under asymmetric information. In my case, by
contrast, due to adverse selection only a low quality good is supplied under asymmetric
information. Second, since he examines costless labelling, there is no trade-oﬀ between
information and labelling cost. By contrast, since I explicitly consider labelling cost,
labelling is not always better than asymmetric information. In the agricultural economics
literature, welfare eﬀects of labelling for biotechnology products have been examined by
several works including Bureau et al. (1998) and Gainsford and Lau (2000). None of these
papers, however, have fully analyzed patterns of trade and welfare eﬀects of trade in a
general equilibrium framework. In the literature of the economics of information, most
of the papers that have investigated the issue of credence goods have focused on expert
services for credence goods and ignored the role of labelling.8 An exception is Marette et
al. (2000). In the context of product safety, they investigate, among other things, eﬀects
of labelling for credence goods. Trade eﬀects of labelling, however, are not examined.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 analyzes the autarky equilibrium with and without biotechnology products. Section 4
examines trade and welfare eﬀects of biotechnology products. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
In this section I set up a simple general equilibrium model with two ﬁnal goods (x and
z), one primary factor (labour), and two intermediate goods (s1 and s2).
2.1 Production
There are two ﬁnal goods denoted by x and z. Labour is the only primary factor of
production, but an intermediate good is also used for the production of x. Good z,o r
manufacturing good, is treated as the numeraire and hence the units are chosen in such
a way that one unit of labour produces one unit of good z, i.e., z = lz,w h e r elz is the
amount of labour employed for the production of good z.S e tp r i c eo fz be one.
8See, for example, Wolinsky (1995) and Emons (1997, 2001).
4Production of good x,o rfood, uses labour and intermediate goods as inputs. Po-
tentially two intermediate goods are available: non-genetically modiﬁed organism (non-
GMO), s1, and genetically modiﬁed organism (GMO), s2. In order to distinguish products
produced by these two diﬀerent intermediate goods, call the non-GM food (non-GMF)
as x1 and the GM food (GMF) as x2. The non-GM technology is embodied in s1 and is
represented by x1 = f(s1,l x1). The GM technology is embodied in s2 and is represented
by x2 = g(s2,l x2). Both f(·,·)a n dg(·,·) are constant returns to scale (CRS) and lxi is
the amount of labour employed for the production of xi. The GM technology is superior
in the sense that f(s,l) <g (s,l),∀(s,l). Following Moschini and Lapan (1997), in order
to measure s2 i nt h es a m ep h y s i c a lu n i t sa ss1 I assume
g(s,l)=f(λs,l), ∀(s,l),λ > 1. (1)
That is, the technological innovation is of a type of its own input augmenting.9
Competitive ﬁrms produce s1 using labour as an input: l1 = κs1,w h e r el1 is the
labour employed for the production of s1. An innovating ﬁrm produces s2 using labour
as an input: l2 = κs2 + η,w h e r el2 is the labour employed for the production of s2
and η is the labour required for inventing s2. The innovation is protected by intellectual
property rights (IPRs), such as patents. For simplicity, I assume that the innovating ﬁrm
does not directly engage in production of the ﬁnal good. I also rule out the possibility
of licensing the GM technology. I also assume that the ﬁnal good producing ﬁrms are
perfectly competitive and that the market structure is not aﬀected by the introduction of
the GM technology. It then turns out that the model exhibits a Ricardian nature.
2.2 Utility and demand
There are L consumers, who are divided into two types: unconcerned (U) and concerned
(C)c o n s u m e r s . U consumers perceive GMF as the same quality as non-GMF, whose
utility is given by uU(x1,x 2,z)=( x1 + x2)βz1−β,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1). C consumers, on the
other hand, perceive GMF as a lower quality product, compared to non-GMF, because
of its potential negative eﬀects on human health. A C consumer’s utility is given by
uC(x1,x 2,z;α)=( x1 + αx2)βz1−β,w h e r eα ∈ [0,1] measures how she perceives quality
of GMF. The share of C consumers is θ ∈ [0,1]. Each consumer is endowed with one
9This is not a crucial assumption. Other types of innovation are also analyzed in a similar way.
5unit of labour. For simplicity, I assume that the innovating ﬁrm’s proﬁts, if any, are
transferred to consumers in a lump-sum way. From the consumer’s utility maximization
problem, if GMF and non-GMF are oﬀered at diﬀerent prices, a U consumer chooses the
cheaper product. A C consumer’s choice, on the other hand, depends on the value of α
and the price ratio of the two products. Let pi be price of xi.I fα<p 2/p1,aC consumer
chooses non-GMF, and vice versa. Total demands for x and z are respectively given by
XD = βIL/p and ZD =( 1− β)IL,w h e r eI is income.
2.3 The government
The government may impose mandatory labelling of GMF or prohibit the marketing of
GMF, if necessary. Because food is a credence good, consumers cannot distinguish GMF
from non-GMF without labelling. I assume that mandatory labelling is the only credible
way to disclose information on whether a product is GMF or non-GMF.10
Labelling is costly. Under mandatory labelling of GMF, each producer of good x2 has
to sort and test his own products. I assume that under mandatory labelling τ>1 units of
food must be produced in order to deliver one unit of food to consumers. In other words,
when the producer price of good x is p, the consumer price of x is given by τp.11 Ia l s o
assume that labelling is required for both GMF and non-GMF if GMF is domestically
produced. The reason is that when both products are produced in one country, there is a
chance that two products are mixed up at some production stage. Thus, non-GMF also
needs to be tested to verify the absence of GMF.12 If GMF is not domestically produced,
however, domestically produced food does not need to be labelled.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
Consider two countries: home and foreign. Foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk
(∗). I assume that the total number of consumers is the same in the two countries, i.e.,
10Individual ﬁrms may provide voluntary labelling. In fact, non-GMF producers do have an incentive to provide voluntary
labelling. However, since food is a credence good and there are a large number of competitive ﬁrms that produce non-GMF,
private labelling by non-GMF ﬁrms is unlikely to be credible. For detailed discussion on credibility of voluntary labelling,
see, for example, Bureau et al. (1998) and Rege (2000). I brieﬂy discuss implications of voluntary labelling in section 5.
11This idea is the same as the “iceberg” transportation costs. See, for example, Krugman (1980).
12Even if non-GMF is labelled, GMF still has to be labelled. This may be because other GMOs that are not permitted
to sell in the home country are also produced.
6L = L∗. I consider the case in which GMO is invented in the foreign country.
3.1 The home country: Autarky without GMO
In the home country, only the non-GM technology is available. Total production of good
x is then given by X = f(s1,l x1). The unit cost function is given by c1(r1,w), where
r1 is the price of s1 and w is wage. By Shephard’s Lemma, input demands are given
by lx1 = Xc1
w(r1,w)a n ds1 = Xc1
r(r1,w), where c1
w(r1,w) ≡ ∂c1/∂w and so on. Then,





r(κ,1).13 As long as good z is produced, w = 1. Hence, r1 = κw = κ.I n
equilibrium, the price of x is given by pA = c1(r1,w)=w¯ µ =¯ µ. Then, it holds that






¯ µβ,i = C,U, (2)
where B ≡ ββ(1 − β)1−β. Note that each consumer’s income is IA = w =1 .
3.2 The foreign country: Autarky with GMO
I now turn to the foreign country, where GMO is available. I assume that parameters are so
that the foreign government allows unlabelled marketing of GMF. When a ﬁrm in the food
sector uses s∗
1, its unit cost function is c1(r∗
1,w ∗), while it is c2(r∗
2,w ∗) when the ﬁrm uses
s∗
2. From Eq. (1), it holds that c2(r∗
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2 (w∗)}. In either case, all x producers adopt s∗
2 (Moschini and Lapan, 1997).
Thus, all food supplied in the foreign market is GMF. Here, I focus on the case where
13Note that zero proﬁt condition yields r1 = κw and that both c1
w(r1,w)a n dc1
r(r1,w) are homogeneous of degree zero.
7λr∗
1 >r ∗M
2 (w∗).14 It then can be written as r∗M
2 (w∗)=σλr∗
1,w h e r eσ<1.15
Total production of x is X∗ = f(λs∗
2,l ∗
x2) and the unit cost function of good x is
c1(r∗
2/λ,w∗). The full employment condition yields X∗ =( L − Z∗ − η)/ˆ µ(σ), where
ˆ µ(σ) ≡ c1
w(σκ,1)+κc1
r(σκ,1) < ¯ µ. The price of x in autarky is given by p∗A = c1(σ1κ,1) <
ˆ µ(σ1) <p A,w h e r eσ1 is the value of σ in autarky. Thus, the price of x is lower in the
foreign country than in the home country. Good x is then relatively more produced and
consumed in the foreign country than in the home country. It holds that Z∗ = l∗
z =
















respectively, where I∗A = w∗ + π∗A
M /L ≥ 1.
4 Trade between Two Countries
Consider now trade between the two countries. Trade takes place in both ﬁnal goods
and intermediate goods. Labour is internationally immovable. When s∗
2 is imported, it
is subject to the domestic safety test, which increases production cost of x2.16 Thus, in
order to deliver one unit of s∗
2 to the home country, the foreign country must export ξ>1
unit of s∗
2. I also assume that even taking importing cost into account the unit cost of x2
for the home ﬁrms is lower than that of x1, i.e., c1(ξσκ,1) <c 1(κ,1) = ¯ µ.
I ﬁrst examine the case of free trade without mandatory labelling. I then examine the
case where the home country imposes mandatory labelling of GMF.
4.1 Free trade without mandatory labelling
When trade is liberalized without labelling, consumers in either country cannot distinguish
between GMF and non-GMF and hence a common world price must be given to food. As
14This is a case of drastic innovation in the terminology of Arrow (1962). I assume that at r∗
2 = r∗M
2 (w∗) the monopolist’s
net proﬁts are non-negative. The case in which λr∗
1 ≤ r∗M
2 (w∗) is not interesting. In that case, r∗
2 = λr∗
1 and hence the
price of food in unchanged after GMO is invented.
15Note that as long as consumers’ total expenditure on x2 is constant at βI∗L and w∗ =1 ,r∗M
2 (w∗)i sﬁ x e da ts o m e
value and hence σ is also ﬁxed. After opening up to trade, however, since the demand for food changes, the derived demand
for s∗
2 will also change. Since σ reﬂects the innovating ﬁrm’s price decision, it will also change after opening up to trade.
16This may be because the use of s∗
2 in production process may have some negative eﬀects on the local environment.
8in autarky, the foreign food producers produce only GMF after trade is liberalized. The
home food producers, on the other hand, have no incentive to produce non-GMF under
free trade without labelling, because the price of food is lower than the unit cost of x1.I t
is obvious that the foreign country has a comparative advantage in food production. The
pattern of trade is rather straightforward, since the model is Ricardian.
Proposition 1 Under free trade without mandatory labelling of GMF, when GMO is
invented in the foreign country, the home country always exports the numeraire and the
foreign country always exports GMF. Moreover, if the demand for food is very strong, the
foreign country also exports GMO.
(Proofs of propositions are presented in the Appendix.)
As is usual in Ricardian models, at least one country specializes and which country
specializes depends on how strong the world demand for food is. Note that neither country
produces non-GMF. GMF completely dominates the world food market.
4.2 Trade with home mandatory labelling of GMF
I now turn to the case where mandatory labelling of GMF is imposed. With mandatory
labelling, price of x1 and x2 can be diﬀerent in the home country. In the foreign country,
on the other hand, a common price must be given to x1 and x2 since there is no labelling in
the foreign market.17 Let p∗ be the producer price of x2 under trade with home labelling.
Then, the consumer price of x2 in the home country is at τp∗.18 Let p1 be the consumer
price of x1 in the home country under trade with home labelling. Since the imported x1
from the foreign country must be labelled, the producer price in the foreign country is at
p1/τ. The domestically produced x1 may or may not be labelled, depending on whether
or not GMF is produced in the home country. There are two cases to consider.
The ﬁrst case is that the world demand for GMF is not very strong. In this case,
since the foreign country can meet all the world demand for GMF, the home country does
17Note that the policy choice of the foreign government is not aﬀected by the policy choice of the home government.
18The innovating ﬁrm may set the price of s2 strategically in order to attract the home C consumers. I rule out this case
by assuming that the innovating ﬁrm’s proﬁts are higher when it charges the monopoly price r∗M
2 than when it charges the
strategic price r∗S
2 .T h a ti s ,π∗
M(r∗M
2 ) >π ∗
M(r∗S
2 ), where r∗S
2 is deﬁned as the price of s2 at which τp∗ = αp1 holds, i.e.,
the home C consumers are indiﬀerent between x1 and x2.
9not produce GMF. Thus, x1 produced in the home country does not need to be labelled.
Thanks to mandatory labelling, the home ﬁrms have an incentive to supply x1.I nf a c t ,
only the home ﬁrms supply x1 in equilibrium. The pattern of trade is then as follows:
Proposition 2 Under trade with the home country requiring mandatory labelling of
GMF, if the world demand for GMF is not very strong, (i) The home country produces
both non-GMF (and non-GMO) and the numeraire and exports the numeraire, and (ii)
The foreign country either specializes in GMF (and GMO) or is diversiﬁed to produce
GMF (and GMO) and the numeraire. In either case, the foreign country exports GMF.
Note that non-GMO s1 is exclusively supplied by the home ﬁrms. Since neither country
has cost advantage in s1, international trade in s1 does not provide any economic gain.
The second case is that the world demand for GMF is very strong. Since the world
demand for GMF exceeds the foreign country’s supply capacity, the home country also
produces GMF in equilibrium. Thus, x1 produced in the home country must also be
labelled. In equilibrium, x1 is produced only in the home country, while x2 is produced
in both countries. The pattern of trade is as follows:
Proposition 3 Under trade with the home country requiring mandatory labelling of
GMF, if the world demand for GMF is very strong, (i) The home country produces non-
GMF (and non-GMO), GMF, and the numeraire, and exports the numeraire, and (ii)
The foreign country specializes in GMF (and GMO) and exports GMF and GMO.
Note that while the home country can import s2 and domestically produce x2,i th a s
a comparative disadvantage in the production of x2. Thus, the home country imports x2
as well as s2. Note also that as in the ﬁrst case, s1 and x1 are produced only in the home
country and non-traded.
4.3 Labelling or import ban?: Normative analysis of trade
I now examine welfare eﬀects of trade between the two countries with and without home
labelling of GMF. Since there is more than one type of consumers in each country, welfare
eﬀects are evaluated on the basis of the Potential Pareto Principle,o rKaldor Compensa-
tion Principle, unless all consumers agree on the ordering of social states.19 That is, even
19The Potential Pareto Principle, which was proposed by Kaldor (1939), provides a complete ordering of social states
without requiring interpersonal comparison of well-being. State x is said to be a Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) on
10though either type of consumers were worse oﬀ by moving, for example, from autarky
to free trade without labelling, the country would be judged to gain from trade without
labelling if it is possible to make free trade at least as good as autarky for all consumers
and strictly better than autarky for some consumers by making hypothetical lump-sum
transfers among consumers. Note that when all consumers agree on the ordering of social
states, the ordinary Pareto eﬃciency criterion can be applied.
I ﬁrst look at welfare eﬀects of trade in the foreign country. Compared with autarky,
it is shown that foreign consumers are all better oﬀ under free trade without labelling.
The reasons are as follows: Firstly, the foreign country experiences the standard gain
from trade. Secondly, the foreign country earns rents to innovation of GMO. Thirdly,
there is no quality eﬀect because foreign consumers all consume GMF both before and
after opening up to trade. Finally, the foreign country beneﬁts from the informational
asymmetry. That is, the home consumers who would consume non-GMF if information
on whether a product is GMF or non-GMF were available are also forced to consume
GMF under free trade without labelling. This raises further the price of GMF.
If the home country imposes mandatory labelling, the foreign country still gains from
trade, compared with autarky. Both types of consumers are better oﬀ under trade with
home labelling. This is because the foreign country still experiences the standard gain from
trade and earns rents to innovation. Compared with free trade without labelling, however,
the foreign country suﬀers from home labelling mainly because the foreign country loses
beneﬁts of informational asymmetry. Moreover, labelling cost lowers further the home
country’s demand for GMF. The following proposition is thus obtained:
Proposition 4 When GMO is invented in the foreign country, the foreign country always
gains from trade. Foreign welfare is higher under free trade without labelling than under
trade with the home country imposing mandatory labelling of GMF.
An implication of the proposition is that mandatory labelling of GMF imposed by the
state y if and only if there exists another state z, which can be reached from x with an appropriate set of transfers between
gainers and losers, such that z is an ordinary Pareto improvement over y, even if in fact these transfers will not take place.
The traditional gains-from-trade theorem is based on this principle (see, e.g., Samuelson (1939, 1962) and Kemp (1962)).
Grandmont and McFadden (1972) analyze the actual lump-sum compensation mechanism that ensures gains from trade.
More recent literature on the gains-from-trade theorem with many consumers explores non-lump-sum compensation that
ensures gains from trade. See, e.g., Dixit and Norman (1980 Chapter 3, 1986) and Kemp and Wan (1986).
11importing country hurts the exporting country of GMF, compared with free trade. It is,
however, better than an import ban of GMF.
I next analyze welfare eﬀects of trade in the home country and policy choice by the
home government. When trade is liberalized without labelling, the home U consumers
are better oﬀ because they have access to cheaper imported food. This is a positive price
eﬀect. While C consumers also enjoys the positive price eﬀect, they may be worse oﬀ
because there is also a negative quality eﬀect due to GMF imports. If the negative quality
eﬀect experienced by C consumers dominates the positive price eﬀect, the home country
loses from trade. Welfare eﬀects under trade with labelling, on the other hand, depend
on the strength of the world demand for GMF. When the world demand for GMF is not
very strong, C consumers are not aﬀected by liberalizing trade since p1 = pA. The home
country thus gains from trade with labelling if and only if U consumers are better oﬀ under
trade with labelling. When the world demand for GMF is very strong, C consumers are
strictly worse oﬀ under trade with labelling because p1 = τ¯ µ>p A. Thus, in order for the
home country to gain from trade with labelling, C consumers need to be compensated.
A comparison between trade with and without labelling again depends on the strength
of the world demand for GMF. When the world demand for GMF is not very strong, by
imposing mandatory labelling C consumers experience a positive quality eﬀect because
they can consume non-GMF under trade with labelling. They also experience a negative
price eﬀect because the price of x1 under trade with labelling is higher than that of x
under trade without labelling, i.e., p1 >p T. C consumers prefer trade with labelling
if and only if pT >α ¯ µ. U consumers also experience a price eﬀect. The sign of the
price eﬀect, however, can be positive or negative, depending on the case. The typical
case would be that U consumers prefer trade without labelling. It happens if and only
if pT <τ p ∗. Then, compared with free trade without labelling, the home country is
better oﬀ by imposing mandatory labelling of GMF if the quality eﬀect experienced by
C consumers dominates the price eﬀect experienced by both C and U consumers. When
the world demand for GMF is very strong, since the prices of both x1 and x2 under trade
with labelling are higher than those in the previous case, the (negative) price eﬀect for
both types of consumers are stronger. Thus, the following proposition is obtained:
12Proposition 5 The home government imposes mandatory labelling of GMF if
(p
T)
β >θ (α¯ µ)
β +( 1− θ)(τp
∗)
β , and (5)
τ<¯ µ/p
∗, (6)
when the world demand for GMF is not very strong and if
(p
T)
β >θ (ατ¯ µ)
β +( 1− θ)(τp
∗)




θ¯ µβ +( 1− θ)(p∗)β, (8)




holds, where φ ≡ 1 − θ(1 − αβ), and if (6) ((8) when the world demand for GMF is very
strong) is violated, the home government rather imposes an import ban on GMF.
An intuitive explanation of the proposition is as follows: As the home country is more
concerned about GMF (i.e., α is lower and θ is higher) and cost of labelling is lower (i.e.,
τ is lower), the home government is more likely to choose mandatory labelling of GMF.
This is because as τ is lower, U consumers are more likely to be better oﬀ by liberalizing
trade with labelling. Moreover, when α is lower and θ is higher in addition to a lower τ,
the quality eﬀect due to labelling on C consumers dominates the price eﬀect of labelling
on both C and U consumers, compared to free trade without labelling. When the home
country is highly concerned about GMF (i.e., φ is low) but cost of labelling is high (i.e.,
τ is high), on the other hand, the home government rather imposes an import ban on
GMF. This is because as φ is smaller the negative quality eﬀect is more likely to dominate
the positive price eﬀect under free trade without labelling. Moreover, as τ is higher, U
consumers are more likely to be worse oﬀ under trade with labelling.
Note that if the world demand for GMF is very strong, the home government is more
likely to impose an import ban and less likely to impose mandatory labelling.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined trade and welfare eﬀects of biotechnology that lowers production
cost but also lowers perceived quality of product. The main purpose was to study recent
13international disputes on trade in biotechnology products, such as genetically modiﬁed
organisms (GMOs). It has been shown that the country in which a biotechnology product
is invented exports the biotechnology product because biotechnology confers comparative
advantage on the country. The exporting country always gains from trade. The importing
country of the biotechnology product, on the other hand, may lose from trade. This is
because biotechnology provides both a positive price eﬀect and a negative quality eﬀect to
the importing country. Without labelling, consumers cannot distinguish between biotech-
nology and conventional products and hence they are forced to consume the biotechnology
product even if they preferred to consume the conventional one. Under free trade without
labelling, neither country produces the conventional product and hence the biotechnology
product completely dominates the market in both countries. As the importing country’s
consumers are more concerned about the negative eﬀects of the biotechnology product,
the importing country is more likely to lose from trade.
Imposing mandatory labelling of the biotechnology product can be a remedy for this
problem. When labelling is costly, the cost of labelling must be suﬃciently low in order
for mandatory labelling to be an eﬀective remedy. Since mandatory labelling imposed by
the importing country necessarily hurts the exporting country, the result in this paper
explains why mandatory labelling causes international trade dispute.
In terms of the regulation for the import of the biotechnology product, labelling is
not always preferred to an import ban from the importing country’s point of view. If the
domestic consumers are highly concerned about the biotechnology product and if labelling
cost is very expensive, then the importing country may put a ban on the import of the
biotechnology product. From the exporting country’s point of view, however, the import
ban hurts the exporting country more severely than labelling does.
In this paper, I assumed that voluntary labelling by individual ﬁrms has no credibility.
The assumption would be reasonable for a large number of competitive ﬁrms. In the real
world, however, ﬁrms often provide labelling voluntarily. As I have argued in footnote 10,
it can be shown that the producers of the conventional product do have an incentive to
provide voluntary labelling. Then, if the credibility of voluntary labelling is suﬃciently
high, the importing country may not have to impose mandatory labelling because vol-
untary labelling will disclose information in the laissez-faire economy. This implies that
14with credible voluntary labelling the importing country is less likely to lose from trade.
However, if the domestic consumers are highly concerned about the biotechnology product
and if the cost of labelling is suﬃciently high, the importing country may be better oﬀ by
imposing an import ban on the biotechnology product.20 This is because the importing
country incurs very high labelling costs to separate the products under free trade. The
import ban would be a cheaper means to separate the products.
A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let pT be the price of x under free trade. For a given σ, the foreign supply of x2 is inﬁnitely
elastic at pT = c1(σκ,1) and the home supply of x2 is inﬁnitely elastic at pT = c1(ξσκ,1),
where c1(σκ,1) <c 1(ξσκ,1).21 Then, if pT <c 1(ξσκ,1), x2 is produced only in the foreign
country. The home country must specialize in z and export z.A t pT = c1(σκ,1) the
foreign country is diversiﬁed to produce x2 and z, while for pT >c 1(σκ,1) it specializes in
x2. This is because at pT = c1(σκ,1), w∗ =1i nb o t hx and z sectors. For pT >c 1(σκ,1),
w∗ > 1i nt h ex sector, while w∗ =1i nt h ez sector. At pT = c1(ξσκ,1), the home
country is diversiﬁed to produce x2 and z, while the foreign country must specialize in x2.
In that case, the home country must export z and import s2. It also imports x2. When the
foreign country specializes in x2, the total output of x2 is given by X =( L−η)/ˆ µ(σ). The
w o r l dd e m a n df o rx is given by XWD = βL(I + I∗)/p. Then, if XWD < (L − η)/ˆ µ(σ)a t
pT = c1(σκ,1), or β<(L−η)c1(σκ,1)/{ˆ µ(σ)L(1+I∗)}, the foreign country is diversiﬁed.
If β>(L−η)c1(ξσκ,1)/{ˆ µ(σ)L(1+I∗)}, the foreign country is specialized and the home
country is diversiﬁed. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The world demand for x2 is given by XWD
2 =( 1− θ)βLI/(τp∗)+βLI∗/p∗.T h ef o r e i g n
country’s capacity of supplying x2 is given by X =( L − η)/ˆ µ(σ). The home ﬁrms in the
20Note that under voluntary labelling the price of the conventional product rather than that of the biotechnology product
is aﬀected by labelling cost.
21Note that since the innovating ﬁrm faces the derived demand for s∗
2 which is diﬀerent from that in autarky, the value
of σ will be diﬀerent from that in autarky.
15x sector have an incentive to produce x2 if p∗ ≥ c1(ξσκ,1). Thus, if XWD
2 < (L−η)/ˆ µ(σ)
at p∗ = c1(ξσκ,1), or β<(L−η)τc1(ξσκ,1)/{ˆ µ(σ)L(1−θ +τI∗)}, x2 is not produced in
the home country in equilibrium. Suppose this is the case. Then, if XWD
2 < (L−η)/ˆ µ(σ)
at p∗ = c1(σκ,1), or β<(L − η)τc1(σκ,1)/{ˆ µ(σ)L(1 − θ + τI∗)}, the foreign country is
diversiﬁed to produce x2 and z. Otherwise, it specializes in x2.
The world demand for x1, on the other hand, is given by XWD
1 = θβLI/p1.T h e
home supply of x1 is inﬁnitely elastic at p1 =¯ µ = c1(κ,1). The foreign supply of x1 is
inﬁnitely elastic at p1 = τ¯ µ.S i n c eXWD
1 never exceeds the home demand for x in autaky,
the equilibrium price of x1 must be p1 =¯ µ and hence x1 is produced only in the home
country. The home country must also produce z and export z. It imports x2. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that β>(L−η)τc1(ξσκ,1)/{ˆ µ(σ)L(1−θ +τI∗)},s ot h a tx2 is produced in the
home country as well as in the foreign country in equilibrium. The foreign country must
specialize in x2 and export s2. It also exports x2. The home supply of x1 is inﬁnitely
elastic at p1 = τ¯ µ. The foreign supply of x1, on the other hand, is inﬁnitely elastic at
p1 = τw∗¯ µ,w h e r ew∗ ≥ 1. Since the demand for x1 never exceeds the home demand for
x in autaky, x1 is produced only in the home country and p1 = τ¯ µ. The home country
must also produce z and export z. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Foreign U and C consumers’ indirect utilities in autarky are given by Eqs. (3) and (4),















It holds that pT >p ∗A. The wage and the innovating ﬁrm’s proﬁts are weakly higher
under trade without labelling than in autarky, i.e., w∗T ≥ 1a n dπ∗T
M ≥ π∗A
M . Then, the
standard terms of trade eﬀect and an increase in income together imply that each type
16of consumer is better oﬀ under free trade without labelling. Similarly, foreign U and C














It holds that p∗ >p ∗A. The wage and the innovating ﬁrm’s proﬁts are weakly higher
under trade with labelling than in autarky, i.e., w∗L ≥ 1a n dπ∗L
M ≥ π∗A
M . It is then shown
that each type of consumer is better oﬀ under trade with labelling. Finally, compare Eqs.
(A.1) and (A.2) with Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4). I have pT ≥ p∗, w∗T ≥ w∗L,a n dπ∗T
M ≥ π∗L
M .
It is easily shown that each consumer is better oﬀ under trade without labelling. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Home consumer’s indirect utility in autarky is given by Eq. (2). Under free trade without
labelling, U and C consumers’ indirect utilities are respectively given by V U(pT,IT)=
B/(pT)β and V C(pT,IT;α)=αβB/(pT)β.H o l d V U(pA,IA + T A)=V U(pT,IT)a n d
have V C(pA,IA − (1 − θ)T A/θ) >VC(pT,IT;α), where T A = {(¯ µ)β − (pT)β}/(pT)β is a
(hypothetical) per-capita lump-sum transfer between U and C consumers, to yield (9).
Note that (9) also ensures V U(pT,IT − θ ˆ T T/(1 − θ)) <V U(pA,IA)w i t hV C(pT,IT +
ˆ T T;α)=V C(pA,IA), where ˆ T T = {(pT)β − (α¯ µ)β}/(α¯ µ)β.
Under trade with labelling, home U and C consumers’ indirect utilities are respectively
given by V U(p1,p ∗,IL;τ)=B/(τp∗)β and V C(p1,p ∗,IL)=B/(p1)β. When the world
demand for GMF is not very strong, it is obvious that C consumers are indiﬀerent and
that U consumers are better oﬀ under trade with labelling if (6) holds. When the world
demand for GMF is very strong, on the other hand, hold V C(p1,p ∗,IL+ ˆ T L)=V C(pA,IA)
and have V U(p1,p ∗,IL − θ ˆ T L/(1 − θ);τ) >V U(pA,IA), where ˆ T L = τβ − 1, to yield
(8). It also ensures V C(pA,IA − (1 − θ) ˆ T A/θ) <VC(p1,p ∗,IL)w i t hV U(pA,IA + ˆ T A)=
V U(p1,p ∗,IL;τ), where ˆ T A = {(¯ µ)
β−(τp∗)β}/(τp∗)β. As for the comparison with the case
of free trade without labelling, when the world demand for GMF is not very strong, hold
V U(p1,p ∗,IL+T L;τ)=V U(pT,IT) and have V C(p1,p ∗,IL−(1−θ)T L/θ) >VC(pT,IT;α),
where T L = {(τp∗)β − (pT)β}/(pT)β, to yield (5). It also ensures V U(pT,IT − θ ˜ T T/(1 −
θ)) <V U(p1,p ∗,IL)w i t hV C(pT,IT + ˜ T T;α)=V C(p1,p ∗,IL), where ˜ T T = {(pT)β −
17(α¯ µ)β}/(α¯ µ)β. When the world demand for GMF is very strong, since the price of non-
GMF is p1 = τ¯ µ rather than p1 =¯ µ, replace ¯ µ in (5) by τ¯ µ to derive (7). Q.E.D.
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